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ABSTRACT
The paper introduces the notion of ‘digital behavioral technologies’ and dis-
cusses them from the perspectives of vulnerability and justice, thereby integrat-
ing perspectives from bioethics or public health ethics and political philosophy.
Digital behavioral technologies have seen a massive uptake in recent years,
but the market for them is hardly regulated. We argue that understanding the
impact of digital behavioral technologies requires understanding individuals not
as abstract, atomized agents, but rather to take their embeddedness into social
structures into account. This also allows extending the focus to groups, relation-
ships and whole societies, which are often structurally unjust. This perspective
provides a corrective to an overly individualistic consideration of digital behav-
ioral technologies, which may suggest itself because of their focus on individual
bodies. We point out some implications of this integrated approach with regard
to the regulation of digital behavioral technologies. We conclude by describing
some implications both for those who work on digital behavioral technologies
and for those who work on questions of vulnerability and justice.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 February 2021; Accepted 5 June 2021
KEYWORDS Digital behavioral technologies; vulnerability; structural injustice; regulation; mHealth
Introduction
Mobile health technologies, such as fitness appsorwearables, canhave amajor
impact on the lives of individuals.1 Take the case of Alex: He is a well-paid con-
sultant in amultinational company specializing indigitalization andbiotech. As
part of the company’s health strategy, all employees receive an email contain-
ingmotivating ideas for a healthier lifestyle. The email promotes an ‘app of the
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1 The following two cases are abbreviated and adjusted versions from the project website of the BMBF-
project META mHealth: Ethics, Law and Society: https://about-mhealth.net.
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month’ thatmeasures physical activity andwithwhich one can set up competi-
tionswith others. Points canbegainedby simple activities, such aswalking and
cycling (calibrated tobodyweight, gender, age andother variables), andbonus
points are awarded for ‘high intensity workouts.’ In order to prevent cheating,
the app recognizes individual patterns of movement, heartbeat and perspira-
tion.Alex andhis colleaguesdecide todoa four-week challenge.Alex is ahighly
competitive character. He changes the structures of his days, to collect asmany
points as possible, and starts neglecting other activities, such as reading books
or meeting friends.
A similar app is used by Nadine, a single mother of three with an insecure
and underpaid job. She sometimes has to work during evenings, which raises
problems of childcare. She also has parents in need of care whom she tries
to see regularly. Nadine is obese and her physician tells her she needs to lose
weight. He recommends a sports group and healthier food, but Nadine knows
that she lacks the timeandmoney toaffordeither. Her friendAlia tells her about
a new app with exercises and a calorie-counting function. Alia connects with
other women on the app and thinks it’s ‘great fun’ and it ‘is for free.’ Nadine
downloads it right away and likes the cheerful design. She switches on the step
count and starts the first workout with the help of the app. She also writes her
first comment for which she gets some likes. However, over the next weeks
Nadine notices that she feels rather burdened because she never seems to find
the time to do exercises. She tries to count her calories, following the discus-
sions about it in the comment section. But sweet snacks are one of the things
that keep her going, and she suppresses the thought that she constantly skips
typing in these calories into the app interface. Nonetheless, she gets more and
more upset with the app and with herself. She feels embarrassed to meet Alia
who texts her howmuch weight she lost.
Is there anything that could be problematic, from a normative perspective,
about Alex’s or Nadine’s use of such an app? How do the differences in their
social situations matter for the evaluation? And what does it mean for society
if more andmore individuals use such apps? According to a recent survey, 42%
of US Americans use ‘tools to measure fitness and track health-improvement
goals’ (Deloitte, 2020). Of these, 77% said it led to behavioral change that was
at least ‘moderate,’ withmuchhigher numbers for youngusers (Deloitte, 2020).
While social desirability bias may play a role in these figures, it seems clear
that the use of such apps, and their impact on people’s lives, deserve scholarly
attention.
This paper has three aims. First, we introduce the notion of ‘digital behav-
ioral technologies’ for capturing the specific phenomenon under considera-
tion. Fitness apps and other wearables are key examples, but meditation apps,
period tracking apps, or dieting apps also belong into this category. Second,
we connect this new phenomenonwith the discourse on ‘vulnerability,’ from a
bioethics or public health ethics perspective (Chung & Hunt, 2012; Luna, 2009;
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Mackenzie et al., 2013), and the discourse on ‘structural injustice’ from political
philosophy, which is also increasingly used in bioethics or public health ethics
(Eckenwiler & Wild, 2020; Powers & Faden, 2019; Young, 2011). Third, we sug-
gest an integrated approach for understandingdigital behavioral technologies
inwhich both individual vulnerabilities and structural societal factors are taken
into account, thereby adding a normative macro focus to the existing micro
perspective. In doing so, the paper suggests zooming out from the individual
user of digital behavioral technologies and takes a wider perspective, which
also accounts for broader social and economic dimensions. In a world marred
by structural injustices, we show how new vulnerabilities in individuals and
groups can be created, which may not meet the eye when one considers only
individual cases. The market for digital behavioral technologies requires regu-
lation, but there is also a need for a broader academic and public debate about
what the arrival of these technologies means for individuals and societies.
Digital behavioral technologies
The convergence of several key digital technologies allows for an
unprecedented range of applications and devices for monitoring personal
data, behavior, as well as affective and mental states. The ubiquity of portable
end-user devices with web access (‘smartphones’) has effectively put a power-
ful multisensory mini-computer into the hands, pockets and bags of billions
of people worldwide (3.8 billion smartphone users by the latest estimates)
(Statista, 2021).
The combination of sophisticated miniaturized sensor technology,2 the
high-volume data streaming capabilities of smartphones, andwireless interac-
tion with other devices (such as wearables, e.g. for optical heartbeat sensing),
powers a quickly expanding set of applications that rely on tapping into highly
personal data streams. Combining a variety of data from different sources
(both sensors and active user inputs) enables the diagnostic and predictive
modelling of behavioral states and dispositions of individual users with high
precision. Coupledwith communication channels for feedback by the program
itself or a community of fellow users – such as ‘likes,’ encouraging messages
or statistics detailing personal milestones – these apps effectively create a
techno-social closed-loop system to influence and ‘guide’ the user’s behavior,
oftenbymeansof gamification, nudging, and relatedmethods frombehavioral
psychology and user-experience design.
In the context of health and well-being, these portable health-related digi-
tal technologies are also referred to as ‘mobile health technologies’ ormHealth
(Messner et al., 2019; WHO, 2011). This set of technologies can be considered
2 These include gyroscopes, GPS, temperature sensors, pressure sensors, fingerprint sensors, accelerome-
ters, microphones, touch sensors and others.
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a part of the wider ecosystem of ‘electronic health technologies’ or eHealth
which also encompasses non-portable systems, such as telemedicine technol-
ogy for remote health servicing, electronic patient records and other systems
(Marzano et al., 2015). As the focus of our analysis is on e-health/mHealth apps
anddevices that are designed to influenceuser behavior regarding their health
and well-being, we call these ‘digital behavioral technologies’ (DBT).
While there are certain challenges for a clear demarcation, on which we
comment below, our operational description of DBTs comprises apps and
devices that (1) collect and analyze digital data (from sensors, user input and
other sources) about a person’s behavior and/or physiology; (2) interact with
the user bymeans of a user interface that provides feedback, e.g. statistics, fig-
ures, encouragingmessages and other interactions; with (3) the goal tomodify
the user’s behavior regarding their health, fitness and other aspects of their
lifestyle that affects their well-being and/or bodily functions. Typical examples
arewearable fitness trackers, period tracking apps, ormindfulness apps. Impor-
tantly, many DBTs are not classified as medical devices and treated as such
by law; individuals can access them simply by downloading them from app
stores.
DBTs are of course embedded into a wider ecosystem of digital technolo-
gies, as well as the global ‘datasphere’ (Burk, 2008), the realm of collected and
curated data, and the ‘infosphere’ (Floridi, 2017), the entire global informa-
tional environment. The digital technologies on which DBTs are based allow
for a precise recording and analysis of personal data, over an extended period
of time, from devices which can be used to make inferences on a person’s (in
this context often referred to as ‘data subject’) behavioral patterns aswell as for
predicting future behavior. In the cases of Alex and Nadine, the DBT measures
and collects behavioral patterns, and enables them to get detailed and granu-
lar feedback on their physical and nutritional activities. The data (and statistics
based on these data) can then be shared within their communities of fellow
app users for social engagement. However, there are specific features that
demarcate DBT within this wider digital ecosystem: the close relationship to
the user’s body and physiology (e.g. through sensors that measure activities);
the circular interaction between a user’s behavior, the app’s measurements,
data, statistics and recommendations (e.g. in the formof rewardsor encourage-
ments); and the focus on well-being and health-related activities. What makes
the conceptual demarcation betweenDBTs and other forms of ubiquitous dig-
ital technologies (such as ‘social’ media,messaging services, etc.) difficult is the
close alignment of DBTs with other digital services: users may post their indi-
vidual workout statistics on ‘social’ media, share images of their latest run on a
photo sharing site, or start an online discussion group on optimal dieting on a
messaging service.
Furthermore, it is often difficult to draw a clear line between health-related,
medical applications and apps that promise to improve well-being, using
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paramedical notions such as ‘relaxation’ or ‘stress relief.’ In other words, the
way that these apps and devices are framed and marketed is (intentionally)
cloudy, most likely to avoid the need to certify the app or device to conform
withmedical device regulation. Another problem indemarcating an app that is
clearly health-related from one that is clearly non-health-related (e.g. for gam-
ing or other forms of entertainment) is the classification of the types of data
that are used to make health-related predictions. While it might be obvious to
most users that measuring their heart rate, skin conductance and other bio-
logical signals can be used to estimate bodily health or find signs of disease,
it is perhaps less obvious that machine learning analytics can use almost any
type of personal data to make health-related inferences: the data from the
smartphone’smany sensors (and other so-called ‘passive data’ that is collected
without the user’s awareness), the data trails that users actively leave in the
web and on their devices (‘active data’); basically any kind of digital data that
can be associatedwith a particular user. Formedicine and clinical research, this
approach to ‘deepdigital phenotyping’ (Onnela&Rauch, 2016) creates promis-
ing opportunities for a better understanding of behavioral patterns that are
associated with mental health disorders, such as depression and anxiety, and
for building better diagnostic tools, e.g. for the early detection of depressive
episodes. For theDBT industry in the consumer space, however, the same tools
for digital phenotyping create newopportunities for building apps anddevices
that can analyze andpredict – and therefore also shape – humanbehaviorwith
unprecedented degrees of precision.
In fact, DBT use also has potential impact on the mental health of users, as
seen in the hypothetical cases discussed earlier. Alex seems ‘hooked’ to the
fitness app, and a detailed examination of his behavior might reveal signs of
addictive behavior. The case of Nadine, too, illustrates ways in which using
DBTs can harmmental health. The constant solicitation of feedback and inter-
action by the app reinforces feelings of shame regarding her body image,
which could ultimately create spirals of negative thoughts and trigger depres-
sive moods.
DBTs arebasedonpermanent surveillanceof theuser’s behavior andperfor-
mance, which creates substantial mental health risks for users. If the data are
shared on online platforms, a significant amount of peer pressure can result.
Scholars emphasize that constant information updates can hinder productiv-
ity and have an addictive potential (Kreitmair et al., 2017) – which seems to
be a risk for Alex. Sociologists have also argued that through such quantifica-
tion of one’s own performance and the comparison with other users, essential
aspects of human life, such as nutrition, sexuality and (un-)healthy behav-
ior, can become associated with feelings of bad conscience, guilt and shame
(Lupton, 2015; Lupton, 2018) – as was the case for Nadine. Ultimately self-
optimization through DBT could potentially even cause depression in users,
doing more harm than good (Fangerau et al., 2016; Hussain et al., 2015). Even
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though terms and conditions of usemay explain certain data- and technology-
related risks, such mental health risks are usually not disclosed to the user.
In the wider social sciences literature, we also find substantive sociologi-
cal analysis and empirical scholarship on the ‘quantified self’ in the context
of work (e.g. Moore & Robinson, 2016) or in relation to ‘self-care’ (if not self-
optimization) practices (Cederström & Spicer, 2015; Ehrenreich, 2018; see gen-
erally also Mau, 2019). Many of these works provide a granular analysis of
the systemic conditions that fuel the drive towards biometric and sociomet-
ric quantification and also give an account of how this impacts the lives of
individuals and their well-being and flourishing.
Many popular apps, whether health-related or for pure entertainment pur-
poses, are explicitly designed to occupy the user’s attention and to maximize
engagement (Wu, 2017). Scholars argue that by tapping into reward networks
in the human brain, these design features can make vulnerable individuals
prone tobecoming addicted togames (Donget al., 2015) and, thus, potentially,
also to apps that use similar mechanisms of user engagement. The combina-
tion of personalization with frequent interactions based on behavioral incen-
tives in DBTs could, therefore, carry substantial risks for global mental health.
This development is also reflected by the fact that both theWorld Health Orga-
nization (WHO) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
in its fifth edition (DSM-5) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) have
introduced Gaming Disorder (ICD)/Internet Gaming Disorder (DSM) as a novel
mental health disorder.
In recent years, there has been a growing debate about the ethical dimen-
sions of apps, digital phenotyping and related topics, in addition to the ongo-
ing discussion about privacy and data protection (Kellmeyer, 2018; Wild, 2019;
Wild et al., 2019). Yet, in biomedical ethics, neuroethics and related fields, the
discussions tend to center on the effects on individual users, for example on
issues of autonomy, informed consent, and enhancement. What has received
less attention in the debate are: (1) the notion of vulnerability, especially which
dimensions of vulnerability are particularly relevant for DBT users; (2) thewider
social and societal effects of the now widespread use of health-related DBTs,
especially through the lens of structural injustice. We now turn to these.
Vulnerability
The potential harms of DBTs can be a source of ‘vulnerability’ for the users
(Kellmeyer, 2019b; Jacobs, 2019). In this section we briefly describe how this
concept has evolved in bioethics and howwe suggest using it as a heuristic to
better understand normative dimensions of DBTs on a micro- and macrolevel.
In bioethics ‘vulnerability’ is a widely established normative concept and
subject to extensive debate (Biller-Andorno et al., 2015; Ganguli-Mitra & Biller-
Andorno, 2011; Hurst, 2008; Mackenzie et al., 2013; Wild, 2012). Although
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vulnerability is relevant in all sub-areas of bioethics, the term has first been
applied and discussed in research ethics. Traditionally, ethical guidelines in the
area of clinical research have defined certain groups of people as vulnerable
who are not in a position to make their own decisions freely (such as prison-
ers), and who cannot formulate them adequately (such as people with severe
dementia). In order to protect individuals from harm (i.e. to reduce vulnerabil-
ity), each personmust provide informed consent before participating in clinical
researchorbefore aphysician canperformamedical procedureon them. There
are special safeguards for individuals who cannot provide informed consent,
such as minimal risk requirements or consent by a proxy.3
In the context of DBTs, such an understanding of vulnerability, focusing on
individual autonomy and consent, might be understood along the following
lines: individuals give their consent to the use of their data and to all other func-
tionalities of a DBT through their agreement with the terms and conditions.
As in the case of clinical trials, only users above a certain age and with certain
mental capacities can and should sign these terms and conditions. This rather
legalistic procedure of ‘informed consent,’ in turn, protects companies from
liability for certain harms, e.g. an infringement of privacy, misuse of data, or
harms resulting from inaccuracies of the DBT. In this context, it is often empha-
sized that ‘digital literacy’ or ‘digital competence’ and ‘data literacy’ require
key skills for individuals to be able to navigate this consent process in a self-
determined and informed way. These skills comprise, inter alia: the practical
and cognitive ability to use apps and devices as intended; understanding the
flow of personal data streams from apps and devices to service providers; or
understanding the difference between opt-out and opt-in when determining
the use of one’s data (Buckingham, 2010; Olson & Torrance, 2014; Pangrazio
et al., 2020; Prado & Marzal, 2013). To support the acquisition of such skills,
users need to be educated about the functionalities of apps and devices, about
the importance of understanding how their data is being used, how this could
potentially harm them and what safeguards could be taken. To achieve this,
authors have suggested – in addition to education within schools – estab-
lishing educational spaces, for example in community libraries or community
colleges, or ‘real-world laboratories’ (Singer-Brodowski et al., 2018).
In the following we argue that this ‘traditional’ understanding of vulner-
ability is shallow in two ways. Based on some well-established criticism of
this understanding, but also adding new elements, we suggest more complex
3 An important part of the ongoing critical discussion of the term vulnerability is directed against the
blanket assessment of individuals or groups as vulnerable. Such ‘labelling’ of individuals or groups is
accompanied by paternalistic attitudes that can lead to stereotyping and discrimination (Luna, 2009;
Mackenzie et al., 2013).Moreover, an imprecise, too inclusive andover-protectionist useof the termunjus-
tifiably excludes entire groups of people from research and its potential benefits. Some argue that the
term has been applied to so many groups that it is losing its normative force (Levine et al., 2004). More
recent approaches to dealingwith vulnerability thus often attempt to avoid the general labelling of entire
groups, but speak, for example, of layers of vulnerability (Luna, 2009).
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dimensions of vulnerability: On the level of the user, and also in relation to the
understanding of vulnerability on a societal level.
First, on the level of individual users we suggest looking back to Alex and
Nadine in order to unpack vulnerabilities which are not solved by signing the
terms and conditions of use. We have mentioned that signing terms and con-
ditions could be seen as a form of ‘informed consent.’ But signing terms and
conditions of apps does not mean that the potential risks described in them
have been well understood by the user. The language of data protection and
safety, as well as detailed technological features of hard- or software are pre-
sented in a highly specialized language which is difficult to understand for lay
persons. Studies show that even individuals with higher education have diffi-
culties understanding these terms and conditions and thatmany simply donot
read the terms and conditions in any detail (Bakos et al., 2014; Plaut & Bartlett,
2011). Moreover, aswe have argued above, DBTs can carrymental risks that are
simply not mentioned in the terms and conditions. An example of disempow-
erment and loss of autonomy are DBTs that operate via highly gamified app
mechanics that might give users the illusion of consent and control, while at
the same time exploiting their propensity for incentive-driven engagement of
their attention (Cheng et al., 2019).
The ensuing vulnerabilities, which are potentially leading to a loss of auton-
omy, self-determination and empowerment (instead of an increase, which is
the marketing message of many DBTs), are not covered by existing informed
consent procedures. New ways of explaining potential harms to users would
be needed, which manage to explain data- and technology-inherent poten-
tial risks in an intelligible way, and help to convey more complex risks, such as
potential loss of autonomy and dis-empowerment.
The second point is connected to a criticism of the term ‘vulnerability’ as
such and addresses the societal level. In bioethics, alternative concepts to the
traditional understanding of vulnerability are being discussed to identify the
constitutive sources of potential vulnerabilities and to determine appropriate
corresponding responsibilities andduties (Hurst, 2008; Levineet al., 2004; Luna,
2009; Mackenzie et al., 2013; Wild, 2012). On the one hand, there are inherent,
universal vulnerabilities based on the human biological make-up (Macken-
zie et al., 2013). On the other hand, one must consider situational, relational
and dynamic vulnerabilities, the causes of which do not lie in the individ-
ual, but rather in social and political circumstances. They must therefore also
be evaluated in a different manner (Kellmeyer, 2019b; Luna, 2009; Macken-
zie et al., 2013; Wild, 2012). This is an interesting lead for considering DBTs:
vulnerabilities cannot be understood exclusively from the perspective of the
individual user. ‘Vulnerabilizing’ factors can also be located in more complex
societal structures and developments, e.g. unequal socioeconomic positions,
or a trend towards over-emphasizing individual (in contrast to public) respon-
sibility for health. One specific example of how societal developments can add
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dimensions of vulnerability with respect to DBTs is the more or less unstruc-
tured way in which digital mental health apps were rapidly deployed during
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, often without adequate regulatory and health pol-
icy oversight (Martinez-Martin et al., 2020), thereby shifting responsibility for
health care decisions onto potentially vulnerable individuals.
We suggest using such an enhanced concept of vulnerability as a concep-
tual lens for the assessment of DBTs. It can help us to identify new vulnera-
bilities for individual users that go beyond a narrow, legalistic understanding
of autonomy and ‘informed consent’ and include richer anthropological and
psychosocial dimensions such as guilt or addictive potential. And it allows for
understanding the introduction of DBTs as disruptive and potentially ‘vulnera-
bilizing’ phenomenon on a societal level, with implications for social justice. In
the next section, we argue that combining this concept with the perspective
of structural injustice adds a crucial additional layer to understanding possible
effects of DBTs.
Structural injustice
To integrate the conception of vulnerability into a broader social and politi-
cal perspective, we suggest drawing on the concept of structural injustice, as
developed by Iris Marion Young (2011). Young develops her account of struc-
tural injustice by evoking the example of Sandy, a single mother threatened
by homelessness in a city with a difficult housing market (2011, pp. 43–45).
Such a situation can come about without any specific acts of wrongdoing,
either on the parts of individuals or on the parts of institutions (2011, p. 45).
Rather, it can result as a confluence of various causes, including the unin-
tended consequences of the actions of many individuals (2011, pp. 62–64),
which, for example, pushes up housing prices in certain areas in processes
of ‘gentrification.’ They lead to a situation in which Sandy is ‘vulnerable to
homelessness’ (2011, p. 45). Young draws on social theorists such as Anthony
Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu in order to emphasize the formal and informal
dimensions of institutions, which create situations that individuals experience
as ‘objectively constraining’ their options (2011, p. 53). The results of struc-
tural injustices are positions of privilege and disadvantage, along different
dimensions.
The concept of structural injustice throws light on the fact that most soci-
eties that DBTs arrive in are marred by massive inequalities, many of which
can be characterized as unjust. These inequalities are multidimensional, and
often such that individuals cannot be held meaningfully responsible for their
own position of privilege or disadvantage. While some of these inequali-
ties are obvious (such as gender-based income inequality), others (such as
inequalities in educational attainment, social partaking or care labor), and the
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points of intersection between them, can be more hidden.4 Depending on
the position of an individual or a group within these intersecting structures,
different vulnerabilities and vulnerabilizing factors can arise, along multiple
dimensions.
If one applies the intersecting perspectives of vulnerability and structural
injustice to the DBT use by Alex and Nadine, a number of dimensions become
visible. Take, first, the fact that Alex has grown up, perceives himself, and is
perceived by others, as a man, and Nadine as a woman. This means that Alex
is, on average, more likely to have been brought up on a narrative that empha-
sizes the importance of competitiveness and ‘being a winner.’ On that point,
he might be more psychologically vulnerable than Nadine. She, in contrast,
is likely to earn less than she would as a man, which could make offers that
come at no monetary cost, but for which she pays by providing her data,
more attractive to her (whereas Alex has sufficient income, or his employer
may even pay for the app). Moreover, Nadine is likely to be affected by social
and cultural norms concerning female bodies, which are often perceived as
stricter than those concerning male bodies. These require her to put time
and energy in keeping her weight under control. But again, as a woman, she
is statistically more likely to have less time and energy available to herself
because she has more responsibilities in unpaid household and care labor, in
whatHochschild has famously called the ‘second shift’ (Hochschild&Machung,
1989).
Other dimensions of Alex’s and Nadine’s positions in society may also have
an impact on what the use of the app means for their lives. For example, the
app may be available only in certain languages, which means that if they are
members of a linguistic minority, they might have problems understanding
the instructions, let alone the details of the terms and conditions. Or the app
may suggest healthy recipes; but in order to follow this advice, users have to
buy certain raw ingredients. Alex is likely to have enough money and to live
in an area where this is no problem, while Nadine may have difficulties find-
ing those, not only because of her financial constraints but also because she
might live in a place in which shops offer less fresh food (see e.g. Krukowski
et al., 2010). If she lives in a place without broadband internet access, this
may also lead to problems in the transmission of data that may, for example,
only show some part of her bodily activities, thus classifying her in a lower
category.
This fitness app, like many other DBTs, implicitly presupposes a certain type
of individual: one that has sufficient control over his or her time and themental,
physical, logistical and organizational possibilities to follow the advice given
by the app. The implied user is someone who is seduced by the narrative of
4 In this respect, the concept also captures what has been described as ‘intersectionality,’ see Crenshaw
(1991); for recent reflections see e.g. Collins (2017), who emphasizes the connection to social justice.
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self-optimization andwillpower (and just needs a bit of support from the app).
But depending on the social position of users, these presuppositions hold to
different degrees, and somemay not hold at all for certain users. Because DBTs
are scaled up for large sets of users, they typically include certain standardiz-
ing assumptions. These are likely to be oriented towards the positions of the
most typical users (or those most lucrative as targets of advertisement), with-
out taking the social positions and potential vulnerabilities of other users into
account.
By drawing on the conception of structural injustice, we can see the individ-
uals who use DBTs as socially embedded agents, whose options and choices
are constrained by their positions of relative privilege or disadvantage along
different dimensions, which create different kinds of vulnerabilities and vulner-
abilizing factors. These different social positions need to be taken into account
whenDBTs are introduced and adopted. DBTs are often accompanied by a nar-
rative of an autonomous and self-determined subject who can and wants to
‘optimize’ his or her lifestyle by help of some digital nudges. The responsibility
for an individual’s health is thereby implicitly shifted to this individual, away
from questions about structures and opportunities, such as the availability of
healthy food or public spaces for recreation and exercise in all neighborhoods.
At the same time,more privilegedmembers of society, with higher purchasing
power, might afford to choose premium models of DBTs in which their data
are notmonetized – or they can afford to go to fitness studios or to use private
coaches, forgoing questions of datafication and exposure to advertisements
altogether.
Rejecting a picture of abstract, atomized individuals, and understanding
them, instead, as socially embedded agents, thereby extending the focus also
to groups, relationships and whole (structurally unjust) societies makes visi-
ble what the impact of DBTs at the societal level might be if they are widely
adopted. This perspective provides a corrective to anoverly individualistic con-
sideration of DBTs, which may suggest itself because DBTs’ focus on the body
of the individual and the aim of changing his or her behavior.
This broader societal perspective is needed not least because it is likely,
given the current trends, that the use of DBTs will be suggested (and incen-
tivized) by health policies, either by insurance companies or by public policy
makers. But this can put highly unequal burdens on differentially situated indi-
viduals. It might even direct attention away from reforms that would address
these broader structures, offering what may seem to be an ‘easy way out’ for
policy makers that allows them to brush harder questions about structural
reforms aside. In a worst-case-scenario, DBT-based policies add vulnerabili-
ties to the vulnerabilities with which disadvantaged individuals are already
burdened (Nadine), or they create vulnerabilities for people who – as indepen-
dent, healthy and wealthy individuals – would not traditionally fall under the
category of ‘vulnerable’ at all (Alex).
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Towards an integrated approach for assessing the impact of DBTs
We do not take these arguments to mean that DBTs should be rejected alto-
gether. Rather, we suggest evaluating them from an integrated perspective
that pays attention to the differentiated embeddedness of individuals within
social structures. This requires looking not only at the situation of individu-
als, but also that of groups; not in order to label or stigmatize their members,
but in order to identify potential vulnerabilities including injustices and their
underlying vulnerabilizing dynamics. And it requires taking into account the
effects of DBTs on societies as a whole, with their multidimensional landscapes
of privileges, psychosocial dynamics and disadvantages.
Currently, the incipient normative discourse on DBTs mostly focuses on
specific technical issues such as accuracy (e.g. in measuring biosignals) or
cybersecurity and privacy (i.e. securing apps and devices from unwarranted
access and data leaks) (Galvin & DeMuro, 2020; Luh & Yen, 2020). Important
as these are, they leave out broader normative questions at the social level as
well as anthropological and psychological aspects of human-technology rela-
tions and interactions (Liggieri &Müller, 2019;Wild, 2019;Wild et al., 2019). The
prevailing design logic of DBTs conforms to and perpetuates a performance-
orientedconfigurationofhuman-technology interaction inwhich theappsand
devices ‘help’ us in becomingour best possible selves: fitter, happier,morepro-
ductive. There are specific risks and harms that this focus on (self)-optimization
can create for users, for example in terms of mental health. When scaled up to
the societal level, the aggregated effects of this optimization imperative may
further entrench, if not escalate, existing structural injustices andmay even cre-
ate new categories and dimensions of injustice (e.g. for people who prefer a
less digitally based lifestyle). Sociological studies already explore thesebroader
effects at the societal level (Lupton, 2016, 2020). In these studies normative
issues are being flagged and discussed, but not from an explicit normative
standpoint or in connection with normative theories and with the aim of an
ethical assessment. This is a gap that needs to be filled, given the increasing
impact of DBTs on the lives of individuals and societies. To do so, the subdis-
ciplines of bioethics, public health ethics, political philosophy and philosophy
of technology need to be brought together, in conjunction with the relevant
empirical disciplines.
Based on the perspectives of vulnerability and structural injustice, we sug-
gest asking a set of questions about the use of digital behavioral technologies
that bring these dimensions into view:
• Are individuals, for whom technology is being designed, understood as
socially embedded, socially situated members of communities?
• What impact would the use of the DBT have for individuals from (variously)
disadvantaged backgrounds and vulnerabilizing contexts?
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• Which vulnerabilities of individuals or groups from disadvantaged or even
privileged backgrounds might be compounded by the use of the DBT?
• Could certain structural injustices stay unaddressed, or even be reinforced,
if theDBTwerewidely adopted? Is there awayDBTsmight be able to reduce
structural injustices?
• What happens if large groups of individuals use this DBT, possibly in a com-
petitive ‘race’ that leads themtoexaggeratebehavioral changes?Howcould
technology be designed to prevent such potential harms?
• Which accompanying measures would be needed in order to make the use
of the DBT safe, just and beneficial for individuals and groups from all kinds
of backgrounds?
• How would a society have to be structured so that certain – otherwise
beneficial – digital technologies could be used in fair and equitable ways?
We do not take this to be a complete list of questions, nor do we think that
it is possible to come up with one definitive list.5 The reason for this is that
the impact of DBTs – which are themselves quite a diverse set of technolo-
gies, as discussed earlier – varies depending on the context. Sensitivity to blind
spots that the producers of DBTs might have, but also to possible unintended
consequences when DBTs arrive in highly unequal societies with their specific
histories of privilege and disadvantage for different groups, are needed.
The producers of DBTs often provide a narrative of self-determination and
of endless fun and gamified possibilities for improving one’s health and well-
being. But our examples of Alex and Nadine show two things: first, this very
narrative can create risks of addiction-like tendencies, even for very privileged
individuals, and second, for less privileged individuals it may simply be unfea-
sible to accomplish, and thereby reinforce psychological problems. Moreover,
for both of them, it may come at the price of giving up highly personal data
and thus adding vulnerabilities with regard to the potential abuse of these
data. It is by situating Alex and Nadine in their broader social structures that
the full impact of DBTs become visible – and certain vulnerabilities, such as the
lack of healthy food options, come under a glaring spotlight. To truly address
them would require structural changes on a large scale.6 They require action
by politicians, lawmakers and public interest advocates in areas that go far
beyond the use of DBTs, andwhich also include cultural and social norms, such
as the imperative of self-optimization. Nonetheless, in what follows, we focus
on some possibilities of law and regulation that are addressed directly at DBTs,
5 This is also why we have refrained from trying to come up with a simple schema or heuristic – the list is
meant as an invitation for individuals to use their judgment when thinking about specific cases and also
to come up with more and other question.
6 This point can be seen in analogy to the discussion about the ‘social determinants of health’ (Deaton,
2013; Marmot & Wilkinson, 2005; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015; Wilkinson, 1997).
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while gesturing to the broader political, societal and cultural questions that are
connected to them.
Possibilities of laws and regulation
If one considers the different vulnerabilities and vulnerabilizing factors indi-
viduals are exposed to, and the structures of privilege and disadvantage they
inhabit, it becomes clear that the steps that might be taken by private app
developers are likely to be insufficient for preventing harms and enabling a
self-determined life and human flourishing for all members of society. To truly
address them would require structural changes on a large scale. Nonetheless,
in what follows, we focus on some possibilities of law and regulation that are
addressed directly at DBTs, while gesturing to the broader political, societal,
and cultural questions that are connected to them.
Like in other markets where products are potentially useful but also carry
risks, the market for DBTs requires critical public scrutiny, societal deliberation
and regulation by law. Ideally, regulatory and governance measures need to
be sufficiently granular and context-specific, to take all potential problems into
account.
At themoment, the legal framework for such apps is rather patchy, with the
exception of technologies that fall explicitly under the regulations for medici-
nal products, e.g. via the EU’s Medical Device Regulation. There is a large grey
market in which commercial providers offer DBTs without much attention to
possible vulnerabilities, let alone structural injustice, and potentially with an
intention of gathering user data for other purposes. This market requires reg-
ulation, just as markets for addictive substances or drugs. While questions of
privacy and the regulation of data markets have received some attention in
public discourse and have led to influential legal frameworks such as the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation, DBTs need to be addressed from a
broader range of perspectives and governance approaches in order to address
issues such as those we outline in this paper.
A useful lens for thinking about possible regulation is consumer protection
law, which can cover DBTs beyond the scope of medical device regulation. It
can prescribe mechanisms that draw on the idea of ‘cooling off’ periods (e.g. a
reminder after a certain period of usage of whether one wants to continue it),
allowing consumers to revert decisionsmade in the heat of themoment. It can
also require theprovisionof certain kinds of information tousers, or forbidmar-
ket claims that lack a scientific basis. For users such as Alex, with high levels of
education and sufficient amounts of free time, itmaybepossible to access such
information even if it is hidden in small print and expressed in technical jar-
gon. In contrast, users likeNadine,whomight lack the educational background
and the temporal resources to study pages of small print, might benefit if cer-
tain pieces of informationweremade available in a standardized, easy to grasp
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way, comparable to the ‘traffic light’ schemes that some countriesmandate for
nutritional information (and of course, there are also deeper questions about
how social structures could be changed in order to decrease the pressures that
make Nadine so vulnerable in the first place).
For types of data that are particularly sensitive, regulation might prescribe
standards of software- and hardware-based encryption for the transmission of
data, based for example on methods such as differential privacy (Winograd-
Cort et al., 2017) or homomorphic encryption (Khedr & Gulak, 2018) and other
approaches (Kellmeyer, 2019a). It might also ban the use of commercial mod-
els, or of models of ‘data against usage’ when particularly sensitive data are
at stake. This might be justified as protecting vulnerable groups against offers
that would add new vulnerabilizing factors to already existing ones.
A somewhat ‘softer’ governance approach is theuseof certification systems,
either on amandatory or on a voluntary basis. An obvious step would be a cer-
tification system for data and device security, which would be beneficial for
all users – vulnerability to data abuse is, after all, a vulnerability shared widely
across demographics. Companies who integrate DBTs into their occupational
health policies might then recommend only DBTs that are certified as fulfilling
certain standards with regard to data security and use. As some technology
companies are already implementing such privacy certification in their online
stores (Statt, 2020), it remains crucial that policymakers donot leave theprotec-
tion of privacy to the very companies that created (or substantially contributed
to) the problem in the first place. Instead, they should provide a set of manda-
tory criteria, or even binding, internationally harmonized laws and regulations,
that ensures democratically legitimized governance and oversight of DBTs.
Moreover, DBTs could be certified with regard to specific health issues. For
users such as Nadine, who look for a solution to a specific issue (obesity, in
her case), this would be useful to help them understand what kinds of behav-
ioral changes are actually useful, evidence-based strategies. Another, more
complex, question could be: how could the technology be designed so that
it acknowledges and improves structural injustices? And of course, the bigger
issue here is how the social structures would have to be changed such that the
social determinants of obesity are addressed.
Another possible form of regulation is that DBTs could be certified accord-
ing to their suitability for certain age groups. Children and teenagers are,
arguably, particularly vulnerable to certain forms of digital marketing and dig-
ital manipulation that play on their need for belonging, social standing and
their neurobiological vulnerability of a not yet fully developed capacity for
controlling reward-seeking behavior (such as games or gamified apps). More-
over, children and teenagers who lack psychological support from parents
might be particularly vulnerable to promises of fitness or other ways of ‘man-
aging’ one’s well-being. Just asmovies and TV series are indexed to certain age
thresholds in many countries, the samemight be appropriate for certain DBTs.
16 L. HERZOG ET AL.
Moreover, educational strategies should go beyond unspecified calls for ‘dig-
ital literacy’ and provide a detailed roadmap for how children and teenagers
can be enabled to understand how DBTs work, what typical pitfalls are, and
how their own vulnerabilities might be exploited, for example in apps that use
methods of ‘gamification’ (Livingstone & Third, 2017; Livingstone et al., 2017).
To summarize, DBT regulation requires an integrated approach to infor-
mational privacy and security that takes vulnerabilities (at the individual and
societal level) as well as the underlying social structural factors into account.
To this end, regulators and policy makers need to develop a context-sensitive
understanding of how structural injustices may increase existing or add new
vulnerabilities for users of DBTs to protect individuals, as well as vulnerable
groups, from undue harm while at the same time enabling the potentially
positive impact of DBTs on well-being and human flourishing. In addition to
regulatory policies and consumer protection laws, a multi-level governance
approach to DBTs also encompasses the level of professional and industrial
standards. In the context of certification systems for DBTs, developing clear
professional norms at the level of coding and other aspects of software engi-
neering (e.g. user interface design) could become an importantmechanism for
ensuring quality standards in DBT development.
Finally, to enhance the emancipatory potential of DBTs, attention should be
paid to ways in which they could be used by individuals or groups in order to
improve their situation. For example, communities of patients that are brought
together as users of a certain app might be given a voice in its creation and
further development. A decision in favor of open programming interfaces can
enable tech-savvy users to modify and improve apps. In such ways, DBTs can
become part of the toolbox that disadvantaged groups can draw upon – not
in the sense of technological ‘solutionism’ that could replace other types of
activism and reform, but as one possible tool for connecting with each other
and for articulating and addressing specific problems.
The suggested steps are reformist, in the sense that they do not assume
a complete overhaul of the current socioeconomic order, but instead aim at
improvements over the status quo. As mentioned earlier, they should go hand
in hand with reforms that address the underlying vulnerabilities, vulnerabiliz-
ing factors and structural injustices, which the arrival of DBTs makes all the
more visible. A remaining challenge is that if certain countries were to take
such regulatory steps, companies and users might still be able to sidestep
them in the global infosphere (Floridi, 2014). But the suggested steps would
nonetheless provide a certain degree of orientation and help users better
understand theevolvingecosystemofDBTswithin the larger data economy. To
be able to give granular and actionable recommendations for policies and reg-
ulatory reforms, given their potentially far-reaching implications, in our view,
should be based on systematic ethical reasoning and evidence from, inter
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alia, quantitative and qualitative social science, psychology and economics
research.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the concept of digital behavioral technolo-
gies to describe the emergingmarket of health and fitness apps andwearables
that collect user data and entice themwith a promise of improved self-control
and behavioral changes. We have drawn on two discourses for understanding
potential risks and harms connected toDBTs: the discourse of vulnerability and
the discourse of structural injustice. We have argued that the introduction of
DBTs needs to be considered not only from an individual, but also from a soci-
etal perspective, considering their potential impact on different groups. We
have also briefly discussed possible steps for legal and regulatory responses
that could make sure that DBTs can unlock their positive potential without
harming individuals in disadvantaged positions.
These arguments have implications both for those interested in social jus-
tice (whether researchers or practitioners/politicians) and for those working
on DBTs (again both researchers and practitioners, including creators). For the
first group, attention to the uptake and development of DBTs can be an impor-
tant building block in understanding current technological developments and
their impact on social justice. While problems of discrimination in algorith-
mic decision-making systems have already been discussed by social justice
theorists (for an overview see Herzog, 2021), the potential impact of DBTs
on individuals’ lives and society has hardly been taken into consideration.
Especially when it comes to proposals to integrate DBTs in programs offered
by employers, health insurers or public institutions, attention to their poten-
tial downsides, in particular for individuals who are already disadvantaged, is
needed.
On the other hand, those who create DBTs or promote their usage (and
also those who do research about them from other perspectives) need to be
aware of the potential impact on vulnerable and socially disadvantaged users.
DBTs are introduced intomulti-dimensionally unjust societies, andwhile some
potential risks and harms can be anticipated from the armchair of the philoso-
pher or the committee meeting of a group of developers, it may not always
be clear what unintended consequences the introduction of DBTs may have.
One strategy for understanding risks andpreventing harms is to involve poten-
tial users from various socioeconomic backgrounds from the very start, and
to integrate their perspectives into the development of DBTs in the spirit of
participatory design and innovation (Kellmeyer et al., 2019). This could hap-
pen, for example, by involving potential users in the design and co-creation of
DBTs for example in ‘living labs’ (Bergvall-Kareborn & Stahlbrost, 2009) or ‘real-
world laboratories.’ Its members could interact both with technical experts
18 L. HERZOG ET AL.
and with experts on the social determinants of health or other socioeconomic
issues, but they could also bring their own situated knowledge and lived expe-
rience to the table. Such proactive measures by companies and communities
could go hand in handwith regulatory approaches. In thisway, the chance that
DBTs can unfold their positive potentials without doing harm or adding to the
vulnerabilities of already disadvantaged users would be increased.
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